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


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# **Indications and Warning Of Soviet Intentions To Use Chemical Weapons During a NATO-Warsaw Pact War**

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED**

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INDICATIONS AND WARNING  
OF SOVIET INTENTIONS  
TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
DURING A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR

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## PREFACE

This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on indications and warning of Soviet intentions to use chemical weapons in a war with NATO was requested by the Under Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Walter B. LaBerge. It discusses the problems of identifying unambiguous indicators of Soviet preparations and intentions to use chemical weapons during a conventional war, with focus on the first use of these weapons.

The memorandum was prepared under the direction of the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces. It was drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency and reviewed by an interagency working group with representatives of CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Members of the Strategic Warning Staff also participated in its preparation. The group was under the joint chairmanship of [ ] of the Office of Strategic Research, National Foreign Assessment Center.

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Summary and Key Findings .....	1
I. Soviet Policy and Doctrine Regarding Chemical Weapons .....	5
II. Soviet Forces for Chemical Warfare .....	7
Production .....	7
Stockpile .....	7
CBR Training and Equipment .....	9
III. Soviet Concepts for Chemical Warfare .....	9
IV. Soviet Operational Planning for Chemical Warfare .....	11
V. Potential Indicators of Soviet Intentions .....	12
Planning .....	12
Logistics .....	12
Release .....	13
Implementation and Execution .....	13
Detection During An Attack .....	15
Conclusions .....	15
VI. Selected Indicators of Soviet Intentions Concerning Chemical Attack .....	16

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## SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS

The overall likelihood of obtaining warning of an impending Soviet chemical attack is low. Most of the planning and preparatory activities leading up to such an operation are generally consistent with wholly conventional operations or are not clearly distinguishable from preparations for nuclear warfare. Some indicators, such as release authority and fire orders, might provide clear warning of Soviet intentions to employ chemical weapons, but the nature of these indicators is such that we cannot rely on obtaining them. We have greater confidence in obtaining warning of the impending use of some type of weapon of mass destruction, either nuclear or chemical, than we have in the likelihood of detecting activities clearly associated with chemical weapons alone.

Four primary categories of activity—planning, logistics, release of weapons, and implementation and execution—are examined in this study. Each offers potential indicators which vary in their detectability as well as ambiguity.

If standard Soviet operating procedures are rigorously observed, planning offers few indicators susceptible to detection. Planning is limited to only a few selected staff personnel, [

] exploitation of highly placed human sources might yield unambiguous indicators, particularly if the Soviets consulted their allies, but we cannot rely upon obtaining such information. [

] Even if indications of planning for chemical operations were received, they would not be unambiguous because general planning for operations would include contingency planning for chemical, as well as nuclear operations, even though neither weapon was intended to be used.

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The release, the authorization by the political leadership to use chemical weapons, and its transmission through the General Staff to military commanders—together with the issuance of operations orders and implementing instructions—would be the clearest indicators of impending use. [

]

The implementation and execution of plans and orders for chemical operations would involve numerous activities, but most would be ambiguous. In general, the closer to the battlefield this activity occurred, the better the chance of detection, although the time between detection and actual use might be very short. [

] Communications intercepts, photography, and human sources would provide varying probabilities of detection of these indicators.

In sum, the preparations which would be taken in any case for operations in contaminated environments would tend to make it more difficult to arrive at judgments concerning Soviet intentions to employ chemical weapons. Among the varied activities anticipated prior to a chemical attack, few, taken alone, would provide a clear indication of Soviet intentions, although the detection of a large number of ambiguous indicators might provide timely warning.

Considering the relatively low probability of detection for most of the indicators identified, our capability to obtain timely warning is questionable. Some indicators could, if detected, provide longer warning times than others. Those indicators concerned with long-range logistics preparations or specific information from Soviet contingency

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plans could provide a long warning lead-time. Other indicators [ ] might be detected only within minutes of an attack, permitting little or no warning.



## INDICATIONS AND WARNING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR

### Section I

#### Soviet Policy and Doctrine Regarding Chemical Weapons<sup>1</sup>

1. The Soviets are clearly planning for the contingency that toxic chemical agents would be used in a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They have a continuing vigorous program to equip and train Pact forces for operations in a chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) environment. In addition, they have produced a variety of modern nerve agents and have the delivery systems and tactics necessary for the large-scale offensive use of these agents, but we do not know the size or the composition of the Soviet stockpile of chemical agents and filled munitions.

2. The Soviets are signatories of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical weapons, although they, like most other signatories, have reserved the right of retaliation. Beyond that we have no direct information on the Soviets' policy for use of chemical weapons and must infer their intentions about the circumstances in which they might use chemical weapons from their writings about the likely nature of a future war in Europe and [ ]

[ ] Because these sources do not directly address the question of Warsaw Pact first use of chemical weapons, there is uncertainty about Soviet policy in this regard.

3. The Soviets categorize chemical weapons—as they do nuclear and biological weapons—as “weapons of mass destruction” whose initial use must be authorized at the highest political level. All of the Pact's operational stocks of chemical weapons and

agents are believed to be under Soviet control in peacetime. Some are stored in Central Europe. The control and release procedures for chemical weapons are not necessarily the same as for nuclear weapons, and there is some evidence that, once released, chemical weapons would be subject to fewer restrictions on subsequent use than nuclear weapons. In addition, peacetime security over chemical weapons appears less rigorous than for nuclear weapons and is believed to be as much to prevent hazardous exposure as to prevent unauthorized use.

4. In the extensive body of available Pact writings dealing with the likely nature of a future war in Europe and addressing the broad strategic and operational considerations for conducting conventional, nuclear, and chemical warfare, there is no discussion of Pact intentions or plans to initiate chemical warfare during a nonnuclear conflict. In other writings which deal with tactical and technical problems of combat without explicit reference to the overall situation, Pact writers do treat the use of chemical weapons extensively. Pact field training for offensive and defensive chemical operations continues, [ ]

[ ] we have never seen [ ] an offensive, first use of chemical weapons by the Pact before the use of nuclear weapons.

5. Whatever the circumstances of initial use, once offensive chemical warfare had been authorized, the Pact's employment doctrine would lead it to attempt to achieve surprise and to employ chemical weapons on a large scale in the hope of catching NATO troops unprotected. Prime objectives, for example, would be to disable airfields, nuclear and logistic depots, and

<sup>1</sup> Paragraphs 1 through 10 of this section and all of section II are identical to corresponding sections of the draft of NIE 11-14-78, “Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO,” which has been agreed upon by NFIB representatives as of August 1978 and which will be submitted to NFIB for review in early September.

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command and control facilities. Other important objectives might include reduction of NATO's anti-armor capabilities and air defenses or stopping amphibious landings.

6. Once widespread nuclear warfare had begun, any constraints on Pact use of chemical weapons due to fear of escalation would disappear and the question of whether or not to use them would be largely tactical. Pact writings on theater nuclear war usually assume that chemical weapons would be used also. In such circumstances, chemical weapons are thought to be valuable complements to conventional and nuclear weapons, because their effects can be more widespread than conventional weapons but they present fewer troop safety problems and produce fewer obstacles to friendly troop maneuver than do nuclear weapons.

7. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on the first use of chemical weapons there are three views within the Intelligence Community. According to one view,<sup>2</sup> it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would initiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of nuclear war. The agencies holding this view base their judgment on the evidence cited above and on their assessment of the risks and benefits which the Soviets would consider in deciding whether to use chemical weapons. [

8. These agencies recognize, however, that Pact first use of chemicals before the onset of nuclear war cannot be entirely excluded. They believe that the circumstances most likely to cause the Pact to initiate chemical warfare during a conventional conflict would be one in which the Soviets saw little possibility of a successful Pact outcome without chemicals and were prepared to see the conflict escalate to nuclear war. In deciding, the Soviets would likely weigh the advantages of a superior Pact chemical warfare capability, and the potential value of the surprise and shock effect on NATO troops, against the possibility that NATO would retaliate with nuclear weapons. In addition, the Soviets could not be confident that the [

<sup>2</sup> The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

damage to NATO from a chemical attack would be sufficient to justify the risk of such an escalation of the conflict.

9. According to the second view,<sup>3</sup> there is a strong possibility that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfare in a conventional conflict. The agencies holding this view point out that the USSR is well prepared to operate in a toxic environment, and they judge that it also possesses the resources to wage offensive chemical warfare on a large scale. These agencies recognize that [

] could impact on the efficiency with which the Pact could exploit its chemical warfare capability. They believe, however, that the following considerations would be more likely to influence a Soviet decision on first use of chemical weapons in a conventional conflict:

- The Soviets might view the risk of NATO nuclear retaliation to be less significant because of their own nuclear capability, or they might conclude that NATO would not respond with nuclear weapons to Pact first use of chemical weapons.
  - The Soviets probably appreciate that mass employment of chemical weapons at the outset of a conventional war could facilitate penetration of NATO defenses and permit the high rates of advance which they believe necessary for victory in a short war.
- They probably recognize that, as in nuclear warfare, the element of surprise would offer distinct advantages to the first user.
- They might see their extensive capability in chemical warfare as providing them a decisive advantage in an area in which NATO could not catch up during a short war.

These agencies believe that in the final analysis the overriding factors governing first use of chemical weapons by the Soviets would be their assessment of NATO's chemical warfare capabilities and the operational advantages they expected to gain from such use.

<sup>3</sup> The holders of this view are the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.

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10. According to the third view,<sup>4</sup> the evidence leads to the conclusion that the Soviets are likely to initiate the use of chemical weapons in a conventional war with NATO. The holder of this view believes that the Pact considers chemical munitions to be tactical weapons, and that the extensive Warsaw Pact training for operations in a chemical environment and the very large number of personnel and equipment with CBR functions are clear evidence (especially in the absence of a sizable chemical threat from NATO) of both Soviet intentions and capabilities regarding the initiation of chemical warfare. [

] In addition, he would emphasize that Pact troops routinely engage in artillery firing and small unit maneuvers in full protective suits, which is highly effective training for operations in a chemical environment. These considerations persuade him that the Warsaw Pact has succeeded, through the invest-

ment of resources and time, in acquiring a chemical warfare capability of unprecedented size and scope. Considering this capability in conjunction with the inherent military advantages of a surprise use of chemical weapons—for example, penetration of forward defenses, neutralization of key targets, and disorganization of the rear—the holder of this view concludes that Pact leaders are likely to initiate chemical operations in a conventional war with NATO.

11. The foregoing judgments notwithstanding, for the purposes of this memorandum, it is assumed that the Soviets decide to use chemical weapons during a nonnuclear NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Europe. Soviet first use of chemical weapons represents the most demanding warning situation and is the focus of the memorandum. Chemical attack involving simultaneous nuclear preparations would provide greater opportunity for warning, and once nuclear weapons are used, it is generally agreed that chemical weapons might be used at any time thereafter.

## Section II

### Soviet Forces for Chemical Warfare

12. The Soviets have had a broad-based research and development program for chemical warfare (CW) since World War II, and they remain in the forefront in CW technical knowledge. Pact forces generally are well equipped and trained to operate in a CBR environment. Pact ground forces have a variety of systems capable of delivering chemical agents which would enable them to cover large areas of the combat zone from the forward edge of the battle area to at least 300 kilometers beyond. Airdropped munitions provide the potential for large-scale strikes against NATO, especially against enemy nuclear delivery targets. Naval weapon systems also provide a theater chemical warfare capability against ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage sites, and amphibious landing operations.

#### Production

13. No facilities in Warsaw Pact countries have been positively identified as currently producing toxic CW agents in militarily significant quantities, although

<sup>4</sup> The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

several in the USSR and some of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have historical associations with CW agent production and may still be engaged in this activity. The nature of CW agent production is such that positive identification of production facilities within an industrial chemical complex is virtually impossible without knowledgeable human sources.

14. There is no question that the Soviets and some East Europeans either have produced or are capable of producing toxic agents, inasmuch as their chemical plants are already handling most of the raw materials required to produce these agents. We believe that the Soviet chemical industry can easily produce sufficient amounts to maintain current Soviet reserves of bulk chemical agents, plus whatever additional quantities are required to replace agents consumed by training and deterioration. The quantities involved are relatively small, and large-scale production of agents would not be necessary.

#### Stockpile

15. At the present time there are 10 major installations in the USSR believed to be associated with

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the storage of CW toxic agents, filled munitions, or both. A lack of evidence precludes determining the size or composition of the Soviet CW agent stockpile, however. Because we know that the Soviets have developed a range of toxic agents and delivery systems and tactical doctrine for their use, and because we have fragmentary evidence on some field depots for chemical storage, we do not doubt that they have operational stocks, including some in Eastern Europe. We believe these include nerve agents such as GB (sarin) and GD (thickened and unthickened soman), as well as older types of agents such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and the mustard/lewisite mixture. Research relating to incapacitating agents, such as the hallucinogen BZ and agents closely related to it, is also continuing, but there is no evidence that any agents of this type are stockpiled.

16. Soviet systems for the dissemination of toxic CW agents provide a capability to attack designated targets in almost any tactical or weather situation. The means of delivery, shown in table 1, include bulk-fill artillery and mortar shells; multiple rail- and tube-launched rockets, chemical mines; warheads for free rockets over ground (FROGs), tactical ballistic missiles and possibly cruise missiles; aerial bombs and possibly spray tanks; and naval chemical munitions.

17. The variety of Soviet chemical agents provides a capability for attacking protected and unprotected

troops in the open and for producing residual contamination on equipment and terrain. Targets in the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably would be attacked with nonpersistent CW agents delivered by tube and rocket artillery and aerial bombs. Some Soviet chemical bombs are fitted with a fuse designed to provide optimum area coverage.

18. Warsaw Pact military writings indicate that fragmentation-chemical shells, which disseminate the liquid agent fill almost entirely as vapor and aerosol in order to cause casualties quickly through inhalation, are filled with GB, mustard, and probably unthickened GD. Thickened GD is also probably filled in aerial airburst bombs and missile warheads to produce casualties from the toxic "rain" effect. Warheads for the FROG and Scud filled with thickened GD and fused to burst at high altitude are planned to achieve a casualty rate of up to 80 percent among unprotected personnel in an area as large as one-third of a square mile (about 1 square kilometer) for the FROG and two-thirds of a square mile (about 2 square kilometers) for the Scud. The casualties would be caused primarily by skin penetration of the toxic, thickened GD "rain."

19. Rocket artillery would be used to blanket large areas with the nonpersistent agents GB and hydrogen cyanide, the latter where immediate occupation of the area after the chemical attack is desired. The blister agents, mustard and mustard/lewisite mixtures, are

Table 1  
Selected Warsaw Pact CW Agents  
and Weapon Systems

Agent	Artillery Munitions (size in mm)	Freefall Bombs (weight in kg)	Rocket Warheads	Missile Warheads
Nerve:				
Thickened soman	—	100	FROG	Scud
Sarin	122, 152	100, 250	BM-21 BM-24	—
Vesicant (blistering):				
Mustard	122, 152	—	—	—
Thickened mustard	122, 152	—	—	—
Thickened lewisite	122, 152	—	—	—
Mustard/lewisite mixture	—	100, 250, 500, 1,000, 1,500	—	—
Thickened mustard/lewisite mixture	—	250, 1,000	—	—
Systemic:				
Hydrogen cyanide	—	250, 500	BM-21 BM-24	—

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contained in aerial and ground munitions fuzed to airburst for maximum area contamination with the toxic liquid. They would be used against personnel in the open and to contaminate materiel and selected areas of terrain, especially on the axes of defensive operations. Groundbursts of thickened blister agent munitions would be used to achieve very heavy contamination of smaller areas. Chemical mines are usually filled with blister agents and would be used alone or interspersed with antitank or antipersonnel mines.

### CBR Training and Equipment

20. Soviet research in chemical, biological, and radiological warfare has been extensive. The Soviets possess large quantities of a wide range of equipment, much of which is of recent design, for use in a toxic environment. Extensive training in its use is integral to military exercises for all Soviet and East European ground, naval, and air forces. These same training procedures and protective equipment would enable the Soviets to operate on the offensive as well as on the defensive within the toxic areas of combat. Equipment and training for chemical protection are combined with that for biological or radiological protection and the special CBR troops are responsible for these three types of activity. At present there are about 60,000 personnel and 8,000 decontamination and 4,000 reconnaissance vehicles assigned to specialized Pact CBR defense units. If all current, active Pact ground, air, and naval units were brought to full strength, the number of Pact CBR personnel would double.

21. CBR protective equipment supplied to the individual soldier is judged to be adequate to protect

him in a toxic environment for a matter of hours or even days, depending on the nature and concentration of the contaminant. The Soviets have developed field protective shelters equipped with ventilation systems providing air from which both toxic particulate matter and toxic vapors have been removed. Air purification systems (filter and positive pressure) are being installed on armored personnel carriers, tanks, and some trucks. The Soviets have several types of decontamination trucks that can be used for decontamination of men, terrain, and equipment, including clothing and weapons. Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are available in adequate quantities and are capable of rapidly detecting all standard lethal Western and Soviet CW agents. As with other nations, a critical weakness is the problem of timely detection of the presence of nerve agents.

22. The Pact has formed CBR defense stations at most of its air regiments to help these forces operate in a contaminated environment. Individual protective equipment and several types of decontamination stations and vehicles for personnel, equipment, and aircraft have also been deployed at most major air bases. Routine training is conducted in CBR defense which includes alerts and exercises.

23. Some classes of Soviet naval ships have been equipped with positive-pressure citadels and filtered ventilation systems to permit them to operate in a CBR environment. Soviet naval ships have wash-down systems to enable them to remove CBR contamination. Some classes of merchant vessels and landing ships also have been constructed with CBR protective systems.

## Section III

### Soviet Concepts for Chemical Warfare

24. The Soviets view chemical weapons as useful and effective under all combat conditions. They believe that in many situations the combined use of chemical weapons with conventional or nuclear weapons would be more effective than the use of any of these weapons alone. The Soviets realize that because of the unique possibilities for defense against chemicals—in contrast to conventional and, especially, nuclear weapons—surprise is of particular importance in a chemical attack. They would strive to strike as

many targets as possible simultaneously, to avoid the increased defensive posture which would result from the dissemination of warning of attacks in progress.

25. The Soviets expect the initial use of chemical weapons to produce very high casualties (as high as 80 percent) among unwarned, unprotected, and poorly trained personnel. Even against warned and protected troops, they expect to obtain significant results (10 to 15 percent casualties). Furthermore, they recognize

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that for some targets, such as logistic facilities and aircraft maintenance and servicing areas, merely forcing personnel to wear full protective clothing continuously could have a deleterious effect on enemy military operations.

26. To obtain the desired high levels of casualties against tactical and operational targets, the Soviets would employ large-scale strikes with very high concentrations of chemical agents. They consider multiround rocket launchers, which deliver a high volume of fire in a short time, to be the best weapons for delivering chemical agents on battlefield targets. The combination of large numbers and generally high rates of fire makes Soviet tube artillery another effective means of attacking tactical targets. Artillery strikes would occur in short intensive barrages. More distant targets would be attacked with FROGs, Scud missiles, and aircraft.

27. Soviet targeting priorities for chemical weapons are identical to those for nuclear and conventional weapons:

- Nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.
- Airfields.
- Headquarters and other command and control facilities.
- Missile and artillery units.
- Maneuver units.
- Reserve formations.
- Logistic installations.

The use of chemical weapons against specific targets would be conditioned by the Soviet view that these weapons are most effective for attacking personnel under cover, suppressing antiarmor defenses, immobilizing reserves, and paralyzing logistic activities. For targets in an axis of advance, the Soviets believe that large-scale use of chemical weapons would enable them to cause casualties on a scale similar to that produced by nuclear weapons but without creating obstacles which would hinder their own operations or destroying facilities they might wish to capture intact.

28. The Soviets have a variety of persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents. According to Soviet doctrine, nonpersistent agents would be used to attack targets in a Soviet axis of advance and installations which the Soviets desired to occupy. Persistent agents would be used to attack most airfields and logistic

facilities, as well as to screen the flanks of friendly forces. Persistent agents would also be employed against ships and amphibious forces afloat, while nonpersistent agents would be employed against amphibious assault forces on the beach. Nerve agents would produce the most casualties for the lowest expenditure of munitions. Fast-acting, rapidly dissipating hydrogen cyanide, which is lethal but less toxic than nerve agents, would be used on important targets in a Soviet axis of advance. Blister agents would be employed against installations and materiel and to contaminate terrain.

29. There is some evidence that chemical munitions are deployed with ground and tactical air regiments in peacetime. We do not know the extent of this practice or what changes would occur during preparations for war. In any event, we expect the Soviets to maintain tight security procedures for chemical weapons at all times.

30. Political authorization for use of chemicals would probably be in the form of a general release and would be disseminated through normal command channels. The initial use of chemical weapons would probably involve a large-scale strike, planned and coordinated at the front level. (See inset.) Authority for subsequent use of nonpersistent nerve agents and persistent nonnerve agents delivered by multiple rocket launchers and artillery might be delegated as low as division level. Use of persistent nerve agents, which could affect a large area for a considerable length of time, would be controlled at army level. Once these weapons had been used, there would be less strict control over their use than would be the case for nuclear weapons.

In the Pact concept, a front is a combined arms organization, usually consisting of three to five ground armies—each numbering three to five tank or motorized rifle divisions; an air army of some 600 tactical aircraft; and those naval and airborne elements necessary to accomplish the mission of the front. The ground forces of the front also include numerous separate combat and combat-support elements such as tank, artillery, missile, and air defense units. A large service-support element numbering about 100,000 men would provide the front with transport, maintenance, engineering, supply, and medical support, as well as resupply of items ranging from ammunition to fuel and missiles. The front itself would total about 400,000 men after full mobilization. Although not directly comparable to any Western organization, the front would be similar to the NATO army group in size, level of command, and function.

## Section IV

### Soviet Operational Planning for Chemical Warfare

31. Soviet operating procedures call for commanders at all levels to plan for the use of all weapons at their disposal, whether or not the use of those weapons has been authorized. Initial Soviet fire planning for any operation, therefore, would be likely to include consideration of the possible use of both chemical and nuclear weapons. Soviet plans for initial wartime operations are prepared in peacetime and would be reviewed and updated in detail in a crisis which threatened to escalate to hostilities with NATO. Contingency planning also would probably include consideration of the possible use of chemical weapons. In a war which began with conventional weapons, Soviet procedures would still call for chemical weapons to be considered in the planning of each subsequent operation.

32. In this section, we describe the official procedures for operational planning in a Soviet combined arms army, as presented in Soviet writings. Other echelons, both higher and lower, contain analogous staffs and would be required to engage in generally similar activity for their operational planning. The procedures outlined below are illustrative of the planning that might take place for an initial chemical attack following a period of combat with conventional weapons alone. In combat situations, actual planning procedures might depart considerably from those described here.

33. Upon receipt of orders the commander of a combined-arms army would call in his chief of staff, chief of operations, chief of rocket troops and artillery, and his political adviser. With the help of this group, the commander would determine the nature of the operation and its impact on his command, and formulate a basic concept for conducting it. According to Soviet procedures, preliminary orders to subordinate divisions should be issued within two hours to alert them for planning and preparation.

34. Acting virtually simultaneously, the chief of staff would be required to assemble a group made up of the chief of operations and the chiefs of the various branches of the combat arms and special troops and

services. The function of this group is to determine the support requirements for the operation. Its work is supposed to be completed within two hours to coincide with the finalization by the commander of his concept of the operation. After issuance of the commander's concept, up to 10 hours would be allocated for detailed planning by the chief of staff, who is assisted by the chief of operations, the rocket troops and artillery staff, and the operations group of the tactical air army.

35. This group would prepare the necessary complementary plans for all combat situations including conventional, chemical, and nuclear warfare. Details of the operation such as rates of advance, coordination, and supply would be considered. Plans would be made for the use of all available delivery systems including aviation, artillery, and missiles. This process would be fully coordinated with the staff at the front level.

36. Support plans would also be prepared. These would include sections on reconnaissance, protection against weapons of mass destruction, and chemical weapons and materiel supply. Reconnaissance is a routine combat activity; however, the Soviets plan to carry out reconnaissance specifically for CBR purposes. This reconnaissance would be performed by specially trained personnel who would determine levels of CBR contamination and designate safe areas and corridors without leaving their vehicle. These vehicles which are specially equipped for such use are included in the standard inventory of reconnaissance units, and would be deployed well forward even in purely conventional operations. Equipment and training for chemical protection are combined with that for biological or radiological protection, and the special CBR troops are responsible for these three types of activity. One of the tasks of these troops would be to ensure the proper allocation of the army's chemical defense assets in support of the general operation.

37. Soviet procedures call for strict security during the planning process. Until the initial planning is completed and preliminary instructions issued to division commanders, only a handful of members of

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the headquarters staff would be included in the process. There would be no briefings conducted within the headquarters. When completed, the operations plan would be signed by the chief of staff and chief of operations and approved by the army commander. Specific plans for the various combat arms and special troops would be signed by their respective chiefs after command approval.

38. An overall coordination plan, or set of coordinating instructions would be maintained at the army headquarters. Divisions would be sent pertinent extracts or main points of the plan only. Instructions would be issued by the commander in a specific sequence, and would include procedures for the

coordination of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. Dissemination of orders and coordinating instructions to lower echelons could be effected by the Soviets' extensive communication network which includes courier, landline, or radio means. Efforts might also be made to mislead opponents by the issue of false orders and information by both radio and wire communications.



39. The planning process described above would apply to any Soviet operation. Some planning involving chemical weapons would take place before any operation, although such planning would be more detailed and intensive before an operation in which the use of chemical weapons was actually intended.

## Section V

### Potential Indicators of Soviet Intentions







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

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


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Section VI

Selected Indicators of Soviet Intentions Concerning Chemical Attack

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